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The author argues in this chapter that trade liberalization in Africa during the last couple 
of decades has led to de-industrialization, slow growth of GDP, low level of investment, 
growing trade deficits, particularly in food items, in many African countries. This has 
been the case despite some improvement in recent years due to increases in the price of 
primary commodities. Drawing also on the experience of successful industrializers as 
well  as  failures  of  premature  trade  liberalization  in  low-income  countries  in  recent 
decades,  he  further  refers  to  pitfalls  in  negotiations  on  NAMA  in  WTO  against  the 
interest of African countries. Discussing the proposals made by developed countries on 
NAMA, he argues that if they are agreed upon, the structure of production and exports of 
African countries would be locked in primary commodities, resource based activities and 
at best low-skill labour intensive products and assembly operation. Finally, he outlines 
conditions for industrialization of Africa and the required changes in international trade 
rules in a way to become conducive to growth and upgrading of the industrial activities of 
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The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the implications of the implementation of the 
proposals  made  by  developed  countries  during  the  negotiations  on  Non-agricultural 
Market  Access  (NAMA),  in  WTO,  on  industrialization  of  Africa,  particularly  sub-
Saharan countries. These countries are characterized by low-level of development and 
industrialization  and  are  already  marginalized  in  international  trade  and  the  world 
economy. Further, they suffer from de-industrialization as a result of policies imposed on 
them by international financial institutions and bilateral donors under the influence of 
Neo-liberals  and  “Washington  Consensus”  the  gist  of  which  is  summarized  by 
Williamson (1990). 
  We will argue that if the proposals made by developed countries are agreed upon, 
they would limit the policy space of sub-Saharan countries damaging their process of 
industrialization and development further. It may, in fact, lock them in production and 
exports  of  primary  commodities  and  at  best  resource-based  products  and  assembly 
operations. Such an outcome will not only lead to their further marginalization, but would 
also have deteriorating effects on their food security.  
  To provide the background to our argument, we will briefly refer to the position 
of Africa in international trade and their development during recent decades. Section II is 
allocated to the explanation of the process and contents of NAMA negotiations and their 
implications  for  industrialization  of  African  countries.  In  this  respect,  we  will 
subsequently draw on historical evidence on trade and industrial policies of successful 
industrializers and the impacts of pre-mature trade liberalization on industrialization of 
developing countries during recent decades. 
  Let us mention here that the inclusion of this chapter in a collection of studies 
which deal with food security may seem misplaced in the first sight. Nevertheless, it is 
highly  relevant  because  of  the  interrelation  between  the  agricultural  and  the 
manufacturing sectors. The growing demand for food is to be satisfied by either domestic 
production of the food stuff, or by imports which has to be financed by foreign exchange 
provided  by  exports  of raw  materials  and/or  industrial  products  (the  later  example  is   3 
Singapore).  The  lack  of  availability  of  raw  materials  and  their  slow  pace  of  their 
international demand requires some degree of industrial exports for many of the African 
countries,  particularly  the  larger  ones.  Further,  development  of  agriculture  and  the 
necessary  infrastructure,  particularly  increases  in  yields,  requires  some  degree  of 
industrial development. Similarly, availability of foods, as wage goods, contributes to the 
development of competitive industrial development (Shafaeddin, 2005.b).  
 
II. Sub-Sahara’s position in world trade and the impact of trade liberalization 
 
In  an  earlier  paper  (Shafaeddin,  1996),  we  have  shown  that  Africa’s  position  in 
international trade deteriorated considerably between 1950 and 1990, particularly in the 
case of Sub-Saharan countries. We also argued that the region would be marginalized 
further  in  international  economy  because  of  its  low  supply  capabilities  in  the 
manufacturing industries, its difficulties in diversification of the production and export 
structures and the nature of globalization and international production networking. We 
will show in this section that since then, the region has been under pressure to liberalize 
foreign  trade  further;  and  many  countries  of  the  region  have  suffered  from  de-
industrialization and further marginalization from international trade.  
  Trade liberalization has been more drastic in Africa, particularly in Sub-Saharan 
countries, than in many other low income regions. The average unweighted tariffs rate of 
the continent for all products, which had declined to 21.7%in 1995, was reduced further 
to 13.1% in 2006 (UNCTAD, 2008.c:table1). Further, in 2006, nine African countries 
showed average tariff rates of less than 10% (based on Loc.cit). Sub-Saharan show even 
lower tariff rate than Africa as a whole; in the same year the unweighted and weighted 
tariff  rates  were  12.1%  and  7.9%,  respectively.  These  rates  are  also  lower  than  the 
corresponding rates of 14.9 and 13.9 for South- Asia, and 12.7 and 12.4 per cent for all 
low-income countries, respectively (UNCTAD,2008.c:table1 and World Bank,2008:table 
6.7).The  manufacturing  sector  was  subject  to  more  or  less,  the  same  degree  of 
liberalization. For example the unweighted and weighted tariff rates for the manufacture 
products of Sub-Saharan countries were 11.9 and 8 per cent as against 12.3% and 12.1% 
for low-income countries as a whole (World Bank, Loc.cit.). Taking export-and import-  4 
GDP ratios as indicators of outward orientation of the economy, it is evident in table 1 
that African countries are more outward oriented not only as compared with developed 
countries, but also as compared with other low-income countries, particularly South-Asia. 
Inset tables 1 and 2 here 
  Trade  liberalization  has  been  accompanied  with  marginalization  of  Africa  in 
world trade, mainly due to slow growth of production, thus exports of, the manufacture 
sector. Table 2 indicates significant decline in the share of Africa in world trade during 
1980-2000 before it improves slightly in more recent years. In particular, the share of 
African LDCs, which include 31countries with about 500 million people (or 7.4 per cent 
of total world population), 
1remains extremely low. The slight improvement in the ratio 
over 2000-07 is basically due to the increase in price of primary commodities During 
2002-07, prices of fuel and other primary commodities increased by annual average rates 
of 23.3% and 16.3%, respectively,
2. These two product groups accounted for 92 per cent 
of  exports  of  African  LDCs  in  2005-06.  The  share  of  the  whole  of  Africa  in  world 
exports of manufactured goods was about 0.72% in 2006; it was 0.27% for Sub-Sahara, 
excluding South Africa for 2003-6
3.  
  As we have mentioned  already, the low share  of the region in world trade is 
basically  due  to  their  low  capacity  in  exports  and  production  of  manufactured  goods 
which  are  among  demand  dynamic”  products  in  international  trade.  The  shares  of 
manufactured goods in exports and GDP of African LDCs were 7.5 and 9.1% in 2005-6
4, 
respectively. The share of manufactured good exports in GDP is less than 10 per cent for 
the majority of African countries (table 3). 
Insert tables 3 and 4 here 
Considering that the countries of the region are at early stages of industrialization, one 
would expect based on experience of other countries (Chenery and Syrqin, 1985) that the 
share of MVA in their GDP should have increased during the last couple of decades. 
Nevertheless,  taking  the  MVA/GDP  ratio  as  an  indicator  of  the  degree  of 
industrialization, table 4 indicates that the region has suffered from de-industrialization 
                                                 
1 Based on UNCTAD (2008.a), tables 8.4.1 and 8.4.2.  
2 Based on UNCTAD, Ibid, table 6.1 
3 Based on Ibid ; table 2.2 and UNCTAD(2008.c), table 8, p.58.  
4 Based on UNCTAD(2008.b), p.8, table 3 
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during the recent decades no matter how various countries are grouped as shown in table 
4.  The  degree  of  de-industrialization  is  even  more  pronounced  if  one  compares  the 
MVA/GDP ratio of recent years with that of 1970s. For the continent as a whole, the ratio 
declined from 21% for 1970-79 to 9% for 2000-06 (Sundaram and Arnim, 2008: table 7). 
The decline in the ratio is partly statistical because of the increase in price of fuel and 
other primary commodities. Nevertheless, the price increase can not explain the decline 
entirely; for the period 1990-99, when the price of petroleum and other commodities 
showed declining trend, the corresponding ratio was 12 as against 21 for 1970-79
5. For 
the particular case of African LDCs, the ratio declined from 10.7 in 1980 to 7.5 in 2006; 
also it fell in 19, out of 31 cases, and increased only in 12 cases (UNCTAD,2008.b: table 
A.5).  
  Generally  speaking,  the  development  performance  of  Sub-Shoran  African 
countries, in particular, has not bee satisfactory following trade liberalization during the 
last quarter century. As is shown in table 5, during 1980s in particular even export growth 
(in  current  terms)  was  negative.  Judged  by  growth  of  exports  and  GDP,  economic 
performance  has  improved  somewhat  during  2000-06.  Nevertheless,  the  improvement 
can not be attributed necessarily to trade liberalization. It is true that export growth is an 
important contributory factor to growth of GDP as it contributes to its growth directly and 
indirectly,  through  availability  of  foreign  exchange  necessary  for  investment  and 
development. Nevertheless, the increase in the value of exports in more recent years was 
basically due to increase in price of non-fuel primary commodities, and petroleum which 
more  than  doubled  and  trebled    during  2002-2007  period
6.In  fact,  the  pace  of  MVA 
decelerated during 2000-2006 as indicated in the same table.  
Insert table 5 here 
  Moreover, trade liberalization contributed more to the expansion of imports than 
growth of exports. When oil exports are excluded, it is evident that trade liberalization 
was accompanied with increase in trade deficits of non-oil exporting African countries 
despite increase in the price of primary commodities in recent years. The trade deficits of 
                                                 
5 The price index of primary commodities was 124.3 in 1990 as against 98.4 in 1999; for crude petroleum it 
was 78.1.6 and 64.3, respectively (Based on UNCTAD, 2008.a: table 6.1).  
 
6 Based on Ibid.   6 
these  countries  increased  from  $6.2  b.  in  1979-81  to  $35.1b  for  1999-01  and  nearly 
$60b.in 2005-7 which is equivalent of about a quarter of their import bill (Based on 
UNCTAD, 2008.a), tables 1.1.1 and 1.1.2).  
  The deficit in food trade of the African countries is, in particular alarming. The 
combination  of  their  own  trade  liberalization  together  with  agricultural  policies  of 
developed countries has had major knock-down effects on agricultural production of the 
continent. Thus food deficits of the continents increased from about $14b in 20002/3 to 
$38.7b in 2007/8 (UNCTAD 2008.c, P.38). In 2005, 24 African LDCs, out of 31, show 
food deficits, out of which in 18 cases the deficits increase significantly over 2000-06 
(based on UNCTAD, 2008.b:table 10).  
  Low  level  of  investment  has  been  another  by  product  of  liberalization  as 
government expenditures were cut in many African countries under the pressure from 
Structural  Adjustment  and  Stabilization  Programmes  of  the  World  Bank  and  IMF. 
Further, the private investment did not particularly respond to trade liberalization and 
FDI has not been forthcoming much (Shafaeddin 2005.a and c and Sundaram and Armin, 
2008).Despite some improvement in recent years, the I/GDP ratio was lower in 2006 than 
that of 1980; the corresponding ratios were 20.7 % and 24%, respectively
7.  
  In short, trade liberalization has not been accompanied with growth of industrial 
sector in most African countries. In fact, de-industrialization has occurred in many of 
these  countries.  And  recent  recovery  in  exports  and  GDP  will  be  short  lived  as  the 
upcoming world economic down turn will definitely lead to decline in price as well as 
volume  of  exports  of  primary  commodities.  There  is  already  some  evidence  in  this 
direction. The price of primary commodities has fallen, on average, by nearly 30 per cent 
between April, when it was at its peak, and end October 2008
8.  
  Taking into account the historical background during the last couple of decades, 
let us see what could be the possible impact of likely outcome of NAMA.  
 
 
                                                 
7 It was 19.1 for 1990 and 17.4 for 2000 (UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics2002, table 7.3 and 
UNCTAD,2008.a. table 8.3.1.  
8 Based on UNCTAD, Commodity Price Bulletin online:  
(http://stats.unctad.org/CPB/tableviewer/document.aspx?FileId=252) 
   7 
 
 
III. NAMA negotiation and its de-industrialization impact on Africa 
 
In this section we will first outline the stated objectives of the Doha Round regarding 
NAMA,  before  referring  to  the  proposals  made  by  developed  countries  during  the 
negotiation  in  WTO.  Subsequently,  the  implication  of  these  proposals  for 
industrialization of African countries will be discussed if they are agreed upon by the 
contracting parties of WTO. 
 
i. Stated objectives of the Doha Round regarding NAMA 
 
The proposals so far made by developed countries during the course of negotiation on 
NAMA are in full contrast with the stated objectives of the “Doha Development Round”. 
The  agreed  text  of  the  Round  clearly  emphasizes  the  special  need  and  interests  of 
developing  countries,  particularly  least  developed  countries
9.Thus  according  to 
paragraphs 16 and 50 of the Declaration a number of principals would be followed during 
the curse of negotiation on NAMA, including: 
￿  Less  than  full  reciprocity  in  tariff  reduction  commitments  in  favour  of 
developing countries; 
￿  Special  and  differential  treatment  for  developing  and  least  developed 
countries as stated in part IV of the GATT 1994, etc.; 
￿  Reduction or elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs and tariff escalation, as 
well  as  non-tariff  barriers,  in  particular  on  products  of  export  interest  to 
developing countries. 
Para 3.b of Article XXVIIIbis (GATT 94) also clearly refers to “the needs of developing 
countries for more flexible [our italics] use of tariffs protection...” Further, the text of the 
July (2004) package again emphasizes the principles of “less than full reciprocity” and 
“flexibility” in favour of developing countries (e.g. paragraphs, 3, 4 and 8 of Annex B to 
                                                 
9 For example, see paragraph 2 and article 6 of the declaration and reference to Article XXVIIIbis of 
GATT 1994, and para8 of Article XXXVI, part IV, GATT 1994).  
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the text of the July 2004 Package)
10. Flexibility would allow a percentage of tariff lines 
deviate from the full extent of the formula cuts or be exempted from them. In addition, 
Para 94 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration refers to proportionality, or balance 
between ambition levels between NAMA and Agricultural market access. The latter also 
implies that the principals applied to NAMA should be consistence with those applied to 
Agriculture.  
 
ii. The position of developed countries during the course of negotiation 
 
In practice, however, the proposals made by developed countries during the negotiation 
on NAMA are neither consistent with those principles nor conducive to industrialization 
and development of developing countries.  
  In fact, right after the conclusion of the Doha Declaration, developed countries 
deviated from the objectives of the Doha Round by making proposals, contained in the 
Annex B of the July 2004 text, against the interests of developing countries. This Annex 
contained elements of less than full reciprocity and Special and differential treatments in 
favour of developed countries rather than developing countries. It was pushed through by 
the  chairman  of  the  negotiating  group  to  be  sent  to  the  General  Council  despite  the 
opposition  by  developing  countries.  The  contents  of  Annex  B  was,  in  effect,  legally 
nullified by the paragraph 1 of the Annex which regarded them as issues for further 
negotiations rather than agreed decisions (Das, 2005:29-30). Nevertheless,  developed 
countries have continued, more or less, on the basis of their original proposals contained 
in the remaining articles of Annex B (Articles 2-17), until the collapse of the talks in July 
2008. Between July 2004 and July 2008 a number of new “chairman texts” have been 
issued but the content of none of them has been development oriented
11. Let us explain 
these issues in slightly more details.  
  Developed  countries  have  been  pushing  for  across-the-board  liberalization  of 
trade in manufactured goods by applying the (non-linear) Swiss Formula for cutting and 
                                                 
10  See Khor, M. and Yen, G.C. (2005) for details. 
 
11  Since then the Chairman presented new texts in July 2007,and in the texts of  8  and 28 February 2008, 
18 May and July 2008. Further, Mr Lamy, the Director-General of WTO, presented his own text on 25 July 
2008 before the talks collapsed once again.    9 
bounding individual tariff lines at low level, by limiting flexibility and requesting “anti-
concentration” in tariff cuts and by asking for compulsory “sectoral initiatives”. They 
have often ignored the views expressed by delegations of developing countries, to the 
extent that certain clauses were inserted in the draft negotiating texts presented by the 
chairman of the NAMA without much prior discussion. Further, the use of time pressure, 
threats, bulling and blame games have been among tactics used by developed countries 
during the negotiations.   
   
iii. The implications of the Swiss Formula 
 
The Swiss formula proposed in July 2004 text and used for negotiation for tariff cuts, 
despite the reluctance of developing countries, is a non-linear formula as follows: 
  T= (a. t)/ (a+t) and  
  R=t/ (a+t)  
where “T” and “t” and “a” are the new and initial tariff rates and constant coefficient, 
respectively, and R is the rate of tariff reduction.  
  This complicated formula has a few main characteristics which are inimical to 
industrialization  of  developing  countries,  particularly  those  at  early  stages  of 
industrialization. 
•   the coefficient (e.g. 15), determines the maximum tariff rate possible under the 
formula  irrespective  of  the  country’s  present  tariff  rates  and  its  level  of 
industrialization, 
•  the lower the coefficient, the higher will be the rate of reduction in tariff, 
•   for a given coefficient, the higher the initial tariff rate, the higher the rate of 
reduction in tariff, 
•   for high tariff rates the rate of reduction in tariffs is higher than when a simple 
linear formula is applied (in which case the same percentage reduction is applied 
to all tariff lines.    10 
•  in  a  certain  range  of  low  tariff  rates,  the  formula  will  lead  to  lower  rates  of 
percentage  reduction  than  those  generated  by  a  tariff-independent  linear 
reduction
12. 
  According to the initial proposals made by developed countries, all countries were 
supposed to apply the same (Swiss) formula to cut average tariffs rates drastically and 
reduce their dispersion by binding 95 per cent of their all individual tariff
13 lines at the 
same rate at low levels. For example, the USA proposed that developing countries cut 
tariffs to 8 per cent by 2010 and reduce them to zero by 2015. Certain sectors were 
proposed  to  be  subject  to  zero  tariffs  immediately  upon  the  conclusion  of  the  Doha 
Round. The EU proposed non-linear cuts in tariffs according to the Swiss formula and a 
low and uniform coefficient of 10 chosen for both developed and developing countries. 
Their  proposal  following  the  Hong  Kong  Ministerial  Meeting  (2005)  was  to  apply 
coefficients  of  15  for  developing  and  10  for  developed  countries,  receptively.  With 
coefficient of 10 for developed countries, a tariff rate of 5 per cent will be reduced to 3.33 
per  cent-a  reduction  of  33  percent,  but  only  1.67  percentage  point.  By  contrast,  a 
coefficient of 15 per cent for developing countries will lead to the reduction of a tariff 
rate of 50 per cent to 11.5 per cent, or a reduction of 38.5 percentages. It is clear that the 
choice of the formula as well as its coefficients would results in less than full reciprocity 
in tariff cuts in favour of developed, not developing countries.  
Since  July2004,  new  coefficients  have  been  proposed,  but  still  remain  biased 
against developing countries. In the July 2007, the chairman proposed the coefficient of 
8-9 for developed countries and 19-23 for developing countries. The tariff cuts were to be 
implemented in 5 years and 9 years by developed and developing countries, respectively.  
iv. Trade-off between the coefficient and Flexibility in tariff cuts  
Further,  according  to  the  text  of  draft  modalities  of  July  2007,  allowing  higher 
coefficients  (lower  tariff  cuts)  to  developing  countries  required  the  trade-off  with 
                                                 
12  For details see Shafaeddin (2006.b). It is also proposed that at least 95 per cent of their individual tariff 
lines be bound.  
13  Five per cent of tariff line can be excepted provided the related imports do not exceed 5 per cent of the 
total value of member’s imports (para 8, annex B of the WTO July 2004 Package). 
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flexibilities in tariff reduction and binding. In other words, the number of tariff lines 
sheltered from formula cuts could be a positive function of percentage of formula cuts on 
those line; the higher the cut (the lower the coefficient), the higher the flexibility (the 
higher  could  be  the  number  of  tariffs  lines  exempted  from  full  formula  cuts). 
Accordingly, with coefficients of 19-23, 5% of tariff lines can be left unbound provided 
they  do  not  represent  more  than  5%  of  imports  of  non-agricultural  products  of  the 
country.  Alternatively,  10%  of  tariff  lines  can  be  exempted  from  half  formula  cut 
provided they do not represent more than 10% of their manufactured imports. Countries 
which are prepared not to use any flexibility can apply higher coefficient of 22-26 i.e. 3 
points higher than otherwise required (19-23)
14. 
  Developed countries criticized the July 2007 text on the ground that developing 
countries are requested to cut tariffs little!! Developing countries, on their part, requested 
a minimum of 25 points difference in the coefficients applied to them and to developed 
countries. They also requested significant flexibilities in tariff cuts. Their views were 
ignored in the subsequent chairman’s draft texts, including his July 2008 text and finally 
in Mr. Lamy’s draft of 25 July 2008 before the talks collapsed. 
  Subsequently, Mr. Lammy, the head of the WTO secretariat, also acted also as a 
chairman of TNC (Trade Negotiating Committee), in proposing a package consisting of 
coefficients of 8 for developed countries and an option of 20, 22 and 25 for developing 
countries. These coefficients were only the mid points of those proposed by the chair in 
his July 2008 text. The flexibilities in tariff cuts would vary depending on the coefficient 
used: 
￿  for the coefficient  25,there would be no exemption to cutting tariff lines,  
￿  for coefficient 20 it would contain two alternatives: exemption of 14 per 
cent, or 6.5% of tariff lines from full formula cuts, provided they would 
not represent more than 16 per cent, or 7.5%of imports of manufactured 
goods, respectively 
                                                 
14 For details see South Centre (2007), particularly pp 30-34.    12 
￿  for coefficient 22, 10% of tariff lines would be exempted from tariff cuts 
provided  they  would  not  represent  more  than  5%  of  imports  of 
manufactured good.  
The difference between coefficients of 25 and 20 is not significant. Taking into account 
the average tariff rate of 30 per cent for developing countries, their new tariff rate would 
be 13.6% and 12%, respectively; they would lead to 54 % (or 16.4 percentage point) and 
60% (or 18 percentage point) cut in tariff rates of developing countries, respectively . By 
contrast,  the  coefficient  of  8  would  lead  to  a  reduction  in  simple  average  tariffs  of 
developed countries from about 3.7% to 2.5% by about 31% (or only 1.2 percentage 
points)
15.  The  comparison  of  these  calculations  reveals  that  the  outcome  is  again 
absolutely  the  reverse  of  the  less  than  full  reciprocity  for  developing  countries.  It 
basically leads to enhanced market access for developed countries.  
  It is interesting to note that in defiance of the agreed rules of GATT, the chair 
claimed  that  there  had  never  been  “agreed  definition  of  reciprocity”.  The  notion  of 
reciprocity and less than full reciprocity in treating developing countries is, however, 
clear in the Decision of 28 November 1979 of GATT (see Appendix A). 
v. Anti-concentration and sectoral issues  
  Further,  Mr.  Lamy’s  proposals  also  limited  flexibilities  further  by  linking 
flexibilities (and coefficients) to the so-called “anti-concentration” clause and “sectoral 
initiative”  which  were  initially  introduced  by  the  chairman  in  his  July  2008  text. 
According to anti-concentration clause, developing countries must not exclude from any 
formula cuts a whole sector or a proportion of tariff lines in a sector beyond a certain 
level. For example, it is proposed that 20 % of tariff lines with at least 9% of total import 
value in any sector (or HS chapter) must be subject to full formula cuts. The implication 
of  this  clause  is  that  various  parts  and  components  necessary  for  development  and 
upgrading  of  an  infant  industry  can  not  be  protected  against  imports.  While  at  the 
                                                 
15 Taking into account the average tariff rates of 3.9,3.2 and 2.3 for the EU, the USA and Japan, 
respectively, it corresponds to 33% (1.3 percentage points) for EU; 29% (1 percentage point) for the USA 
and 22% (1.6 percentage point) for Japan.   13 
beginning of industrialization, duty free imports of parts and components are necessary, 
the  increase  in  domestic value  added  is  important  as  time  passes. Such  development 
requires flexible and dynamic trade policy (see below). 
  The sectoral initiative, was supposed to be non mandatory; it means contracting 
parties should voluntarily reduce tariffs in some sectors to zero or near zero. In practice, 
in the 18 may draft modalities introduced by the chair of NAMA, the sectoral initiative 
was  linked  to  flexibilities.  In  other  words,  to  acquire  extra  flexibility  (or  a  higher 
coefficient); a country ought to participate in sectoral initiative. 
Hence, the Swiss formula with a low coefficient fits the interests of the developed 
countries, while it goes against the interests of developing countries, particularly those 
which are at early stages of industrialization. Developing countries would be subject to 
significantly  greater  reduction  in  their  tariff  rates  in  terms  of  percentage  as  well  as 
percentage points. Even with the latest coefficients and flexibilities proposed By Mr. 
Lamy, the policy space of developing countries will be limited, there will be less than full 
reciprocity and special and different treatment in favour of developed countries. It is true 
that the initial tariffs of developed countries are much lower than those of developing 
countries, but developing countries do need higher tariffs on industrial products as will be 
mentioned shortly.  
vi. Exceptional clauses for LDCs 
The July (2004) package provides some exceptional clauses and extra flexibilities for 
least  developed,  small  and  vulnerable  economies  and  recently  acceded  countries  in 
applying  tariff  cuts  and  binding.  However,  they  are  insufficient,  for  providing  them 
policy space for industrial development. Some of the proposals in fact limit their policy 
space. Regarding Least developed countries, according to paragraph 45 of the July (2004) 
package and as well as para 9 of its annex B on NAMA framework exempt them from 
applying the formula cut and from reducing tariffs or participate in sectoral approach. But 
they are expected to substantially increase their tariff binding commitments. The Hong 
Kong Ministerial meeting (para 18) and the July 2007 text confirmed this proposition;   14 
developed countries also offered them free market access to at least 97% of all their tariff 
lines.  In  the  Hong-Kong  meeting  they  were  promised  simplification  of  the  Rules  of 
Origin  which  applies  to  trade  preferential  schemes.  They  were  also  exempted,  on 
temporary basis, from obligations in the TRIM agreement by allowing them to maintain 
the existing measures, which deviate from the obligations under the TRIM Agreement, 
for 7 year and from any new measures they may introduce for 5 years. This transition 
period may be extended (WTO, 2005; Annex F). 
  Nevertheless,  first  of  all,  exemption  from  tariff  reduction  would  not  apply  to 
countries which are members of a Custom Union (e.g. Lesotho, Anogola, Mozambique, 
and Tanzania). Secondly, the binding of tariff at a low level would reduce their policy 
space  and  flexibility  in  changing  their  individual  tariff  rates  for  different  groups  of 
product (consumer good, intermediate goods and capital goods). Such a dynamic and 
flexible tariff structure is necessary for upgrading of their industrial. As is exemplified in 
table  6  different  industries  require  different  tariff  rates  in  different  phases  of 
industrialization depending on their degree technology intensity. 
Insert table 6 here 
  Thirdly,  provision  of  duty  free  access  to  97%  of  tariff  lines  allows  importing 
developed  countries  to  continue  imposing  tariffs  on  about  300  products.  As  least 
developed countries usually have concentrated export structure of manufactured goods 
around  10  tariff  lines  or  so,  in  essence  they  may  not  be  able  to  benefit  from  that 
exemption (South Centre, 2007: 22).  
  Fourthly, the idea of simplification and improvement in transparency in the Rule 
of Origin, which is often an obstacle to expansion of exports of manufactured goods from 
least developed countries, has not been taken up. 
  Finally, considering that the process of industrialization is pretty long, 5, or even 
7 year, exemption from obligations related to the TRIM agreement is too short and their 
prolongation is not certain in order to provide incentives to investors to invest in activities 
with long or medium gestation period.     15 
Hence, the exceptional provisions provided to LDCs are not sufficient to satisfy 
the needs of these countries for industrialization or upgrading of their industrial base 
vii. Other tactics used by developed countries 
Arbitrary insertion of some issues in the draft modalities, by the chairman of the 
NAMA negotiating committee, threat, bulling and blaming have been other tactics used 
by developed counties during the negotiations. For example, the views expressed by the 
chairman in various draft modalities (e.g. July 2007 text and 8 February and 28 February 
2008 texts) were attributed to the majority of members. Yet, developing countries did not 
confirm this proposition and regarded some of issues included in his texts arbitrary as 
they had been hardly discussed in the formal meeting. Hence, they were regarded as 
“coffee shop” proposals.  
An example of threat and bullying is that made during the course of negotiation in 
July 2008 when anti-concentration and sectoral initiative were introduced and discussed. 
The  US  and  EU  representatives  threatened  that  unless  these  issues  were  accepted  by 
developing countries as drafted by the chairman, they would not agree to opening the 
brackets in the text on other issues on which progress had already been made
16.  Another 
example  is  their  threat  that  without  successful  NAMA  outcome,  there  would  be  no 
reduction  in  agricultural  subsidies,  no  liberalization  in  services,  no  advance  in  trade 
facilitation, and no development round
17. 
Finally,  while  developed  countries  did  not  show  much  flexibility  during  the 
negotiation,  each  time  the  negotiation  was  interrupted,  they  blamed  a  number  of 
developing  countries  engaged  in  small-group  discussions.  Further,  while  developed 
countries insisted on limiting flexibilities in tariff cuts in negotiation on NAMA, they 
requested far greater flexibilities in tariff reduction as well as subsidies in the course of 
negotiation for liberalization of trade in agriculture. 
                                                 
16  See “Divisive issues throw shadow over NAMA state of play” in the SUNS (South-North Development 
Monitor), 9 July 2008. 
 
17 Ibid, 30 May 2008. See also zeroing in previous pages.    16 
 
IV. Implications for industrialization 
The  application  of  the  proposed  coefficients,  limited  flexibilities  suggested  by 
developed countries, and insufficient exceptional clauses for least developed countries 
will have a significant detrimental long-term effect on industrialization of African and 
other developing countries which are at early stages of industrializations. They have by 
contrast  no  negative  effects  on  developed  countries.  Developed  countries  are  already 
industrialized; they have the supply capacity to produce capital-intensive, skill-intensive 
and technology-intensive goods. By giving up some-in fact in this case small - trade 
barriers on imports in exchange for market access in developing countries, developed 
countries  do  not  sacrifice  their  long-run  industrial  development.  Of  course,  their 
upgrading of the industrial sector depends on the development of new technology. But 
they have firmly secured protection of their new technologies through the WTO's TRIPS 
Agreement as mentioned in the previous pages. 
By contrast, the industrial sector of African, and other low-income, countries is, 
unlike that of developed countries, underdeveloped, and the use of tariffs is almost their 
only remaining trade policy instrument. They need to apply higher tariffs to some of their 
industries,  particularly  newly  established  ones.  The  low  and  bound  tariffs  rates  will 
disarm them of an important policy tool for establishing new industries and upgrading the 
existing ones. Clearly, if they obtain further market access in developed countries, they 
will improve their prospects for expanding exports of products produced by their existing 
efficient industries, i.e. industries in which they have static comparative advantages. But 
binding tariffs at low levels deprives them of the tool of diversification and expansion of 
supply  capacity  in  new  industries  in  which  they  may  wish  to  develop  dynamic 
comparative advantage. Therefore, even if market access is provided for such potential 
products, the prospects for their supply expansion will be absent due to the lack of their 
policy space. In other words, for the sake of better access to markets for their current 
export products, they sacrifice the ability to establish new industries or diversify their 
production  structure  away  from  primary  commodities  or  upgrade  their  manufacturing   17 
sector  into  new  products.  Such  a  trade-off  will  result  in  deepening  of  their  static 
comparative advantage. It may, in fact, lock them in production of resource based and at 
most simple labour intensive industries and assembly operations.  
  Professor Wade correctly argues that “International rules should be judged against 
how they assist or hinder production diversification” (Wade2006: 8), not specialization 
according to static comparative advantage. Otherwise, whatever efficiency is gained due 
to liberalization will be at the cost of growth and diversification in the long-run. He is 
also correct to say that WTO rules makes the “creative function” of the markets more 
difficult  by  hindering  diversification  and  upgrading  of  the  production  structure  in 
developing countries; but they encourage industrial upgrading in industrialized countries 
as  they  “permit  industrial  policy  activism  of  the  kind  needed  to  nurture  ‘knowledge-
intensive’ industries and activities which prevail in developed countries! (Wade 2006: 8-
9).  The protection of technology intensive industries through TRIPs is a clear example of 
such encouragement as mentioned earlier. 
  Before  ending  this  section,  note  that  applying  the  CGE  models  in  their 
simulations exercises, the neo-liberals conclude that developing countries are the major 
winner of the simulated Doha scenarios (e.g. Bouet et.al, 2007). These models, however, 
are based on restrictive and unrealistic assumptions and static comparative advantage 
theory disregarding the need for supply capacity building in accordance with the principle 
of dynamic comparative advantage (Shafaeddin 2005.b). 
V. Lessons from History 
The  experience  of  successful  industrializers  and  premature  liberalization  in 
colonies, and in developing countries in more recent years, provide us with lessons from 
history  indicating  that  premature  liberalization  will  lead  to  de-industrialization 
(Shafaeddin  (2005.a  and  2006.a)
  18.The  experience  of  successful  early  and  late 
industrializers indicates first of all that with the exception of Hong Kong, no country has 
managed  to  industrialize  without  going  through  the  infant  industry  protection  phase, 
                                                 
18  The following paragraphs are based on Shafaeddin (2006.a). See also Wade (2007).   18 
although across-the-board import substitution and prolonged protection have also led to 
inefficiency and failure 
Secondly, government intervention, both functional and selective, in the flow of 
trade  and  in  the  economy  in  general  has  played  a  crucial  role  in  the  process  of 
industrialization.  In  all  cases,  including  Great  Britain,  industrialization  began  on  a 
selective basis, although to a different degree, and continued in the same manner until the 
industrial sector was consolidated. 
  Thirdly, when their industries matured industrialized countries began to liberalize 
selectively and gradually. Therefore, trade liberalization is beneficial after an industry 
reaches  a  certain  level  of  maturity  provided  it  is  done  gradually  and  selectively.  In 
contrast,  premature  trade  liberalization,  whether  by  early  industrializers,  by  colonies 
during  the  colonial  era,  or  by  developing  countries  in  more  recent  decades,  has  had 
disappointing  results.  For  example,  when  the  USA  tried  to  liberalize  pre-maturely  in 
1847-61, the industrial sector suffered and the country had to revert to protectionism 
against imports from Great Britain. 
  Fourthly, government intervention was not confined to trade; the state intervened 
through other means, directly and indirectly, in particular to promote investment and to 
develop the necessary institutions and infrastructure. Industrialization was also supported 
by attention to and growth in agricultural production. Hence, the issue is not the lack of 
intervention, but the nature and the efficiency of government intervention. 
  Fifthly, while different countries did not follow exactly the same path, all learned 
from the experience of others; the USA learned from Great Britain, Germany from the 
USA, Japan from Germany and the Republic of Korea from Japan, etc. 
  Sixthly, all main early industrializers tried to open the markets in other countries 
when their industrial sector matured. In the 19th century, free trade policy was forced on 
the colonies and the 5 per cent rule (according to which 5 per cent was the maximum 
tariff rate allowed on any import item) was imposed on semi-colonies and independent   19 
countries through "unequal" bilateral treaties and/or through force (for example, in China, 
after the opium war of 1839-42). 
  Further, the policy space of the colonies, in the 19th century, was further limited 
by England by outlawing high value-added manufacturing activities in the colonies and 
banning the export of competing items from colonies to England (Chang2005.b). Instead, 
production  of  primary  products  was  instituted  and  promoted.  The  outcome  of  the 
imposition of pre-mature trade liberalization on the colonies was devastation and led to 
de-industrialization. For example over 90 per cent of textiles industries of India were 
destroyed as a result of liberalization by the colonial power. 
Recent experience 
  During recent decades, African and many other developing countries have been 
pushed through multilateral organizations, bilateral trade agreements and donors to open 
their  markets.  In  addition,  tariff  peaks  and  escalation  and  arbitrary  anti-dumping 
measures have been among the means of restricting imports of high-value added products 
from developing countries. The results of a study, by the author, of about 50 developing 
countries which have undertaken trade liberalization during the 1990s indicates that with 
the exception of East Asia, their trade liberalization has had three main features which are 
common with the proposals of developed countries in NAMA negotiations:  
•  Premature and rapid liberalization. 
•  Uniformity: i.e. a tendency toward uniform tariff rates for various industries in 
each country;  
•  Universality, i.e. application of the same recipe to all countries irrespective of 
their level of industrialization and development;  
The  results  of  this  kind  of  liberalization  have  been  disappointing  for  most  of  the 
countries other than those in East Asia. Firstly, only 20 countries, or 40% of the sample, 
have shown high (more than 10% a  year) rate of growth of exports of manufactured   20 
goods. And of these, only in about 10 countries (mostly in East Asia) were high growth 
rates  of  exports  accompanied  with  increasing  or  high  growth  rates  of  Manufacturing 
Value Added (MVA). MVA is a more important indicator of performance than export, as 
it measures the net output or income accruing to the country, whereas a rise in exports 
could also be accompanied by a corresponding or even higher rise in imports (including 
inputs that are used in the production of exports).  
Secondly,  and  more  importantly,  in  fact,  in  half  of  the  sample  countries  de-
industrialization  took  place  over  1980-2000.  The  MVA/GDP  ratio  declined  without 
recovering  to  its  initial  level.  In  many  countries  industrial  employment  also  suffered 
severely. 
Thirdly, when exports expanded, this growth was mainly in resource-based industries 
and some assembly operation without much upgrading, except for industries which were 
dynamic during the import-substitution era and were near the stage of maturity, or which 
continued  to  benefit  from  some  sort  of  support from  the  government.  The  aerospace 
industry of Brazil is a good example of an industry which was near the stage of maturity 
and benefited from trade liberalization.  
  Fourthly, even though the relative incentives changed in favour of exports, the 
manufacturing industry suffered from low investment despite a significant increase in 
foreign  direct  investment  in  some  cases  (for  example,  Brazil).  Investment  in 
manufacturing  suffered  because  the  balance  of  risk  and  return  turned  against  the 
manufacturing sector (Shafaeddin, 2006.b). 
  The brief review of development in Africa presented in section II of this paper is 
consistent with the results of the survey summarized above
19. In the case of countries 
which are at early stages of industrialization and development, different industries require 
different  rates  of  protection  and  different  lengths  of  time  for  their  development  as 
mentioned earlier. This is because there are differences in risks and scales of production 
involved in different industries which also need different length of time and experience 
                                                 
19 See also Easterly (2001 and 2002).   21 
for their technological upgrading. Further, uniform tariff rates provide different effective 
rates of protection for various industries, depending on their import intensity. For given 
uniform  rates  for  output  and  inputs,  the  higher  the  import  intensity,  the  lower  the 
effective  rate  of  protection.  As  a  result  uniform  rates  involve  biases  against  new 
industries  as  new  industries  usually  have  high  import  intensity.  This  explains  why 
assembly operations do not easily lead to increases in value added as shown in the case of 
Mexico (Gallagher and Shafaeddin, 2008). 
  In  short,  if  agreed  upon,  proposals  made  by  developed  countries  on  NAMA, 
would lock the structure of production and exports of African countries into primary 
commodities, simple resource-based and labour intensive products and at most assembly 
operations.  
          VI. Concluding Remarks 
 
We have shown in this chapter that African countries, particularly Sub-Saharan countries 
have become increasingly marginalized from international trade and the world economy 
during the last couple of decades following considerable trade liberalization and increases 
in their openness. While their X/GDP and M/GDP share has increased to a level higher 
than low-income countries as a whole, trade liberalization has been accompanied by de-
industrialization in many African countries. Moreover, the private investment has not 
been stimulated as neo-liberals expected. In 2006, the investment/GDP ratio was lower 
than that of 1980 despite some improvement in recent years due to availability of foreign 
exchange as a result of increases in price of primary commodities. Further, GDP growth 
has been slow and trade liberalization has led to increases in trade deficits, including 
deficits in food trade, as imports increased faster than exports. As a result, dependence on 
external factor has increased considerably while poverty is widespread. 
  Under  these  conditions,  developed  countries  have  been    pushing  African,  and 
other developing countries, to cut tariffs on their industrial goods substantially and reduce 
their restrictions on activities of multinationals in exchange mainly for a slight cut in their 
tariffs on industrial goods and in their domestic supports for agriculture. Although some 
exceptions are proposed to least developed countries, they are insufficient to prevent their   22 
lose of policy autonomy, particularly if they bind their individual tariffs lines at low 
levels.  
  Drawing on the lessons of historical experience, we have argued that as African 
countries  lose  their  policy  space  necessary  for  development  of  their  industries  in 
accordance with the principal of “dynamic comparative advantage”, their structure of 
production and exports will be locked in primary commodities, resource based industries 
and at best low-skill labour intensive activities and assembly operations.  Of course, they 
may  gain  some  market  access  for  products  for  which  they  have  static  comparative 
advantage. But such gains would be at the cost of slow growth and lack of diversification 
of their production structure and development in the long-run.  
  What is more damaging than NAMA is conditions which EU is trying to impose 
on  African,  and  other  members  of  ACP,  countries  under  EPA(Economic  Partnership 
Agreement)-although we did not discuss it here (see e.g. Oxfam,2008.) 
  What  is  needed  for  developing  and  industrialization  in  accordance  with  the 
principle  of  dynamic  comparative  advantage  (Cline1983,  Amsden1989,  Gomery  and 
Baumol, 2000, Wade, 2005 and Shafaeddin 2005.b), is first of all that African countries 
should have a clear concept of their industrial development strategy and trade policy 
before entering into negotiation in WTO or other forums. This is a necessary condition. 
However, it should be emphasized that any intervention might not serve the purpose of 
diversification  and  upgrading.  For  this  purpose  the  decision  making  capacity  of  the 
government should improve to enhance the efficiency of its policy making mechanism. 
While a country may learn from the experience of others, it can not copy them; each 
country has its own characteristics which may be different from others to some extent. 
Thus development of government capacity in policy making is an essential factor.  
  The sufficient condition is that the rules of the World Trading System should be 
changed in a way that it would be conducive to industrial development of developing 
countries by allowing a dynamic and flexible trade policy with dimensions of space and 
time. Such a framework of international trade rules should
20 accommodate countries with 
                                                 
20 For details see Shafaeddin (2005.b), and Wade (2006):10-13.   23 
different  levels  of  industrialization  and  development  at  each  point  in  time,  therefore 
allowing “Special and Differential Treatment” as a rule not as an exception. Therefore, 
the concept of “less than full reciprocity” should be taken more seriously as countries are 
at  different  levels  of  development  and  have  different  needs.  Change  in  trade  policy 
should be allowed in each country as the country develops; hence a country should be 
allowed  the  necessary  policy  space  for  both  selective  infant  industry  protection  and 
gradual  and  selective  liberalization,  when  an  industry  reaches  near  maturity.  For 
liberalization  of  the  tariff  structure,  flexibility  would  dictate  that  only  average  tariffs 
(which may be even higher than the current average rate) are bound  with significant 
dispersion (Akuz 2005). The trade rules should also permit the use of export performance 
requirements by African and other developing countries in TRIMS. Easier transfer of 
technology  to  African,  and  other  developing  countries  which  are  at  early  stages  of 
development, should be permitted by changing TRIPS Agreement and revising Subsidy 
and  Countervailing  Measures  Agreement  and  GATS  to  provide  more  policy  space 
particularly for low-income developing countries. 
  Of course, such a re-conceptualization of the trading system will not take place 
over night, but it eventually need to happen (Helleiner, 2005). Recent development in 
international financial market is a clear indication of over reliance on market forces even 
in  developed  countries,  let  alone  countries  at  early  stages  of  development.  The 
international community should not wait for facing a human disaster in Africa and other 
low-income countries before acting to change international trade rules. 
 
Appendix A: 
The Decision of 28 November 1979 on Differential and More  
Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of developing Countries. 
The developed countries do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in 
trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to trade of developing 
countries,  i.e.  the  developed  countries  do  not  expect  the  developing  countries,  in  the 
course of negotiations to make contributions which are inconsistent with their individual 
development, financial and trade needs. Developed contracting parties shall therefore not 
seek, neither shall less-developed contracting parties be required to make, concessions 
that are inconsistent with the latter’s development, financial and trade needs. 
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Table 1: The trade/GDP ratio of Africa and other groups of counties (2006) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Region         X    M    (X+M) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
All Africa        38.2    32.1    70.3 
North Africa        43.3    31.3    74.6 
North Africa ex. Sudan    44.8    32.0    76.8 
Major African petroleum exporters  51.2    26.3    77.5 
African least developed countries  38.2    36.2    74.4 
Sub-Saharan African countries
a  34.8 (35)  32.2(36)  67.0(71) 
Sub-Sahara ex. South Africa    38.1    32.7    70.8 
Low-income developing countries  27    30    57 
South Asia        22    26    48.0 
Developed countries      26    27.5    53.5 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Based on UNCTAD (2008.a) table 8.3.2 except the figures in brackets and those 
for South Asia and Low-income countries which are based on World Bank ( 2008), table 
4.8. 




Table 2: Percentage share of Africa in world trade, 1980-2007 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          1980    1990    2000    2007 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Exports:         
Total Africa        5.86    3.08    2.37    2.87 
Sub-Sahara, excluding South Africa  2.46    1.23    1.09    1.34 
African LDCs
a        0.6    0.46    0.33    0.66 
Non-oil exporting Africa
b    2.55    1.67    1.18    1.30 
 
Imports:          
Total Africa        4.52    2.70    1.96    2.43 
Sub-Sahara, excluding South Africa  2.12    0.96    0.80    1.03 
African LDCs
a        1.15    0.69    0.66    .82 
Non-oil exporting Africa
b    2.68    2.02    1.53    1.78
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sources: UNCTAD(2008.a), tables 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 
a. Includes Haiti      b. Excluding major petroleum exporters.  
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Table 3: The percentage share of exports of manufactured goods in GDP of African 
countries (2000-06) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Share in total exports    No. of countries    % of total 
              Each group     Cumulative     
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Less than, or equal to 1    9      25.7    25.7 
1-2          6      17.1    42.8 
2-5          8      22.9    65.7 
5-10          5      14.2    80 
10-15          2      7.7    87.7 
Greater than 15
a      5      14.3    100 
Total          35      100 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sources: calculated by the author based on UNCTAD(2008.c), table 7 and pp-55-56.  






Table 4. The percentage share of MVA in GDP of Africa
a (1990-2006) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Year    All  S-S  S-S    N.A.  LDCs
b   petroleum   
        ex.SA          exporters 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1990    16.5  17.8  15.1    13.5  9.7    12.2 
2000    13  12.8  9.4    12.9  7.7    10.1 
2006    11.6  11.5  7.7    11.5  7.5    9.1 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sources:  Based  on  UNCTAD  (2008.a)  and  UNCTAD,  Handbook,  data  online,  Table 
8.3.1 and 8.3.2 and UNCTAD82008.b),Appendix table 5 
 
a: all variables are in current terms 
b: 10.7 for 1980. 
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Table 5 : Indicators of Economic performance of Sub-Saharan countries (1980-2006)
a 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    GDP    GDP.    MVA     Investment  Export 
        Per capita          value   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1980-90  2.1    -0.8    1.7    -3.8    -0.9 
1990-2000  2.7    -0.1    4.7    4.5    4.3 
2000-06  4.9    2.4    3.4    7.6    15.3 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sources : Based on UNCTA(2008.b)table A.5 and (2008.a), tables 1and 8. 






Table 6: Evolution of average tariffs for various groups of 
industries at different phases of industrialization 
 
Phase  RB&LI  LT  MT  HT  Manufactures 
(Average) 
I  20  0  0  0  5 
II  10  40  0  0  12.5 
III  0  30  50  0  20 
IV  0  20  40  40  25 
V  0  10  30  40  20 
VI  0  0  15  25  10 
VII  0  0  5  15  5 
VIII  0  0  0  0  0 
Source: Akyüz (2005: 27). 
 
Notations: 
RB:  Resource-based industries 
LI:  Labour-intensive industries 
LT:  Low-technology-intensive industries 
MT:  Medium-technology-intensive industries 
HT:  High-technology-intensive industries 
 
 
 
 
 
 